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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES III
INTRODUCTION
Margaret A. Berger*
The essays that follow are expanded versions of presentations
made to federal and state court judges at the third Science for
Judges conference, held at Brooklyn Law School in March 2004.
These programs, which are funded by the Common Benefit Trust
established in the Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability
Litigation, are held under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s
Center for Health, Science and Public Policy in collaboration with
the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts,
and the Science, Technology and Law Panel of the National
Academies of Science. The program’s aim is to examine evolving
scientific issues in order to assist judges in handling litigation in
their courtrooms, and that goal is certainly achieved by the papers
that follow. Although the topics were chosen long before the dates
on which the conference took place, recent developments have
intensified the significance of the cutting-edge subjects that were
discussed.
The first session, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific
Research, dealt with the complexities of relationships within the
scientific community that shape the scientific culture in which
research is conducted and reported. The extent to which conflicts
of interest within the biomedical enterprise skew scientific
conclusions and impact public health has lately been a topic of
considerable interest to regulators, academics, the media, and the
public. Much of this debate was fueled by recent disclosures about
failures to release research data regarding the effect of
* Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Professor Berger is the Director of the Science for Judges Program.
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antidepressants on children1 and the incidence of heart attacks and
strokes following the use of cox-II inhibitors.2
In light of these newsworthy events, two papers that follow are
of particular interest. The first3 is by an insider, Dr. David Korn, a
prestigious participant in the medical community; the second4 is by
Professor Sheldon Krimsky, whose research agenda has long
focused on linkages between science and public policy. Despite the
very different perspectives from which they write, both authors
agree that far-reaching changes have resulted in the
commercialization of biomedical research and express serious
concerns about the implications these changes have for the
production of credible science. Dr. Korn endorses a variety of
changes directed at managing financial conflicts of interest, but
cautions that overzealous efforts may have deleterious
consequences with regard to the production of biomedical
research. Professor Krimsky’s paper focuses on studies published
in medical journals that examine the effect of funding on research
conclusions. He concludes that the mere disclosure of financial
conflicts may be inadequate to protect the integrity of scientific
research and cautions judges about biases that may infect a
Daubert hearing.5 Read together, the two papers demonstrate the
enormous impact scientific conflicts of interest may have on
resolving questions both in and outside the courtroom, and the
difficult task judges face in evaluating the research on which
experts rely.
David Michaels and Celeste Monforton’s paper6 carries
1

See, e.g., Barry Meier, Contracts Keep Drug Research Out of Reach,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1.
2
See, e.g., Barry Meier, Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble
for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A1.
3
David Korn, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, 13 J.L &
POL’Y 7 (2005).
4
Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and its Implications for
the Judiciary, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 43 (2005).
5
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), requires
federal judges to screen proffered expert testimony to determine whether it is
relevant and reliable. See also infra note 11.
6
David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the
Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal
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forward two themes discussed in the first two papers: the medical
crises that may be precipitated by a lack of crucial information and
the impact funding may have on the availability of data. Michaels
and Monforton pose these questions with regard to the regulation
of workplace hazards by administrative agencies. Starting with the
case of Eric Peoples, a 32-year-old worker in a microwave popcorn
factory who developed a rare and devastating lung disease after
being exposed to a butter flavoring chemical, they examine the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA)
response and failure to take regulatory action. They conclude that
workers may ultimately have to rely on the courts as the only path
to compelling more protection in the workplace. According to the
authors, “there is a growing trend in regulatory agencies that
demands proof over precaution in the realm of public health and
the environment.”7
The remaining essays are devoted to a very different, but
equally timely, subject: the admissibility of forensic evidence in
criminal proceedings. Just weeks before the conference was held,
one of the topics—fingerprinting—took center stage when the FBI
announced that the fingerprints of Brandon Mayfield, a Portland,
Oregon attorney, had been found on a bag of detonators discovered
near the scene of the terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain that killed
191 people and injured several thousand more. Many
developments in this case and the final denouement—the Spanish
authorities’ rejection of the fingerprint match, the identification of
someone else as the source of the print, and the release of Mr.
Mayfield from custody—took place after the live program at
Brooklyn Law School. Fortunately for the reader, Professor Sandy
Zabell, who made the presentation on fingerprints, has revised and
updated his remarks to include a full discussion of the Mayfield
case.8 His article presents a fascinating study of how mistakes in
matching fingerprints can occur and explains why reliable
fingerprint identifications hinge not only on the examiner’s ability
to make matches, but also on having data that validate the
Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 17 (2005).
7
Id. at 32.
8
Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143 (2005).
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frequency with which particular friction ridge details occur. He
then examines in detail the current research on fingerprints, which
is deficient in these respects, and compares what is known about
fingerprints with what is known about DNA.
The differences in fingerprint and DNA analysis are
particularly compelling because of the papers that precede
Professor Zabell’s in this issue of the Journal of Law and Policy.
Professor Julian Adams examines the methods used to match
nuclear and mitochondrial DNA samples and then discusses how
the frequency of DNA profiles is determined.9 He stresses “that the
evidentiary value of DNA evidence is directly related to the
frequency of a DNA profile.”10 He explains how the estimated
frequency of a nuclear DNA profile has decreased following the
increase in the number of STR loci used by the FBI, and contrasts
and accounts for the much higher frequencies associated with
mitochondrial DNA. His discussion reinforces Professor Zabell’s
conclusions about the lack of validated knowledge regarding the
frequency of fingerprint patterns.
Professor Edward Cheng’s article on mitochondrial DNA
further highlights the differences between nuclear and
mitochondrial DNA.11 It also contains a succinct and valuable
discussion of problems posed by mtDNA evidence that courts may
have to resolve in the future. For instance, although examinations
of mtDNA clearly seem superior to microscopic hair analysis in
more accurately attributing hairs found at a crime scene to their
source, on what grounds, if any, should courts repudiate the
microscopic technique on which they allowed experts to rely for
more than a century? Is this a Daubert question, a matter of “best
evidence,” or a Rule 403 problem? Professor Cheng’s discussion
provides a useful framework for examining issues that arise as
other new technologies emerge or old technologies are challenged.
One such challenge is the subject of Michael O. Finkelstein

9

Julian Adams, Nuclear and Mitochondrial DNA in the Courtroom, 13
J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2005).
10
Id. at 88.
11
Edward K. Cheng, Mitochondrial DNA: Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L.
& POL’Y 99 (2005).
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and Bruce Levin’s article on bullet-lead analysis.12 The FBI’s
crime laboratory had, for many years, been analyzing and
comparing the composition of bullets recovered at a crime scene
with that of bullets found in the possession of a suspect. If the
concentrations of the elements in the samples compared closely
enough, the FBI’s examiner would declare that the bullets matched
and then would further testify about the probative value of the
match. In response to growing objections about this testimony by
FBI experts, particularly with regard to probative value, the FBI
commissioned a study by the National Research Council. A
committee (on which Mr. Finkelstein served) was appointed to
examine the technique of bullet-lead matching. It issued its
findings in February 2004.
Part of the Finkelstein and Levin paper discusses the
committee’s findings and recommendations. The committee
concluded that FBI experts at times testified in ways that could not
be justified by the available science and data. The paper explains
why this is so and gives examples of acceptable and unacceptable
formulations by experts that should prove extremely helpful to
judges and lawyers working on cases in which testimony about
bullet-lead analysis is offered. Furthermore, the paper explains that
the limitations suggested by the committee would apply to other
kinds of expert identification testimony and, if adopted, “would
change the way opinions in expert testimony are expressed in our
courts.”13
Although analyses of the first decade of experience with the
Supreme Court’s new test14 for the admissibility of expert
testimony demonstrate that courts rarely applied Daubert criteria to
12

Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Compositional Analysis of Bullet
as Forensic Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 119 (2005).
13
Id. at 129.
14
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a
discussion of Daubert and subsequent Supreme Court cases regulating the
admissibility of expert proof, see Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s
Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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prosecution experts,15 that mindset may slowly be starting to
change. Indeed, the FBI’s request for a report on the validity of
bullet-lead testing may be an indication that a sea change is in the
offing. The second half of the Finkelstein and Levin paper is,
therefore, extremely important because it examines in detail the
scientific underpinnings for bullet lead analyses, relates them to
Daubert factors, and suggests additional scientific studies for the
FBI to undertake. This approach might serve as a template for
scrutinizing other forensic identification techniques and may assist
judges in handling the Daubert challenges to prosecution experts
they may increasingly face in the future.
These very brief descriptions of the essays that follow certainly
do not do justice to the authors’ sophisticated explorations of their
topics. It is hoped, however, that these remarks convey a glimpse
of the variety, complexity, and currency of the scientific questions
that judges may encounter in their courtrooms, and that the essays
themselves will prove helpful in understanding and resolving the
demanding science intertwined with policy issues that arise in
twenty-first century America.

15

Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an
(Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (stating “the
Daubert revolution, aimed at upgrading the quality of expert evidence, has had
surprisingly little impact in the criminal courts.”). See also Symposium, Expert
Admissibility Symposium, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2003).

